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THE STATE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VOUCHER 
PROGRAMS: RELIGION IS NOT THE SOLE 
DETERMINANT 
Preston C. Green III* 
Peter L. Moran** 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines state constitutional provisiOns 
relating to publicly-funded voucher programs and determines 
their susceptibility to non-religious-based arguments. This 
article organizes the provisions relating to publicly-funded 
voucher programs into three categories: (1) "uniformity 
provisions," which require states to provide a uniform system of 
public schools; (2) "local control provisions," which delegate the 
authority to control public schools to local entities; and (3) 
"funding provisions," which contain language that prohibits 
states from funding non-public schools. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This introduction explores a brief history of voucher 
programs and some of the arguments for and against them. 
Next, it introduces some of the potential constitutional issues 
presented by voucher programs. It will explore the 
Establishment Clause issues triggered by voucher programs 
and their ultimate resolution by the decision Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris. The introduction will then discuss potential 
non-religious constitutional issues triggered by voucher 
programs. Finally, the introduction introduces the major 
discussion of this Article and set up analysis of state 
constitutional Issues unrelated to traditional religious 
arguments. 
Voucher programs are initiatives that "allow parents to use 
all or part of the government funding set aside for their 
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children's education to send their children to the public or 
private school of their choice." 1 According to the National 
School Boards Association, as of early 2009, voucher programs 
for private school education existed or had been authorized 
statewide in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Utah, as well 
as the cities of Cleveland, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and 
Washington, D.C.2 
Although vouchers still face significant opposition, public 
support for these programs has increased. Recently, the 
general public has become more supportive of voucher 
programs. According to a 2008 poll, 44 percent of Americans 
supported permitting students and parents to choose a private 
school to attend at the public's expense-the largest level of 
support since 2002.3 The issue remains contested as supporters 
and critics of voucher programs offer contradictory conclusions 
regarding such a system's merits. 
Proponents cite a number of factors in support of voucher 
programs. They note that parents who use vouchers experience 
higher levels of satisfaction with their children's schools.4 
Supporters observe that voucher students tend to demonstrate 
achievement gains in mathematics, and that these programs 
save money for state governments and local public school 
districts.5 Meanwhile, opponents counter that voucher 
programs withhold sorely needed funds from public school 
systems. 6 Voucher program critics also indicate that research 
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**Peter L. Moran, J.D. is a Ph.D. Candidate in Penn State's Department of Education 
Policies Studies and a Fellow at the Penn State University Law and Education 
Institute. 
1. THE FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, ABC's OF SCHOOL CHOICE: 2007-
2008 (6th ed.) (2008). 
2. National School Boards Association, Voucher Strategy Center, 
http://www.nsba.org/MainMenu/Advocacy/FederalLaws/SchoolVouchersNoucherStrate 
gyCenter.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
3. William J. Bushaw & Alec M. Gallup, Americans Speak Out- Are Educators 
and Policy Makers Listening?: The 40th Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the 
Public's Attitudes toward The Public Schools, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 9 (2008). 
4. See, e.g., Patrick J. Wolf, School Vouchers: What the Research Says About 
Parental School Choice, 415 BYU L. REV. 446, 434-445 (2008) (reviews existing 
research on voucher programs). 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, SCHOOL VOUCHERS: 
THE RESEARCH TRACK RECORD STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT (2005) available at 
http://archive. aft.org/pubs-reports/teachersN oucherTrackRecord2005. pdf (reviewing 
existing research on voucher programs). 
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fails to prove that voucher programs improve students' 
academic achievement, and express concerns that private 
schools are not accountable to the public for publicly provided 
funds. 7 
A. The Legal Debate 
In the legal arena, voucher programs raise a number of 
potential federal and state constitutional issues. For a number 
of years, the legal community primarily focused on whether 
voucher programs violated the Establishment Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution by authorizing public money for religiously-
affiliated schools.R The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this issue 
in Zelman u. Simmons-Harris, declaring Cleveland's voucher 
program constitutional.9 After Zelman, commentators 
predicted the rise of religious-based state constitutional 
challenges to publicly-funded voucher programs. 1° For 
example, Clint Bolick, vice president of the Institute for Justice 
(a pro-voucher group that argued before the Supreme Court in 
Zelman), stated that "there are some states where it is 
absolutely clear that we could not promote school choice under 
the state constitution." 11 Bolick also guaranteed a religious-
based strategy, observing that "we're now going to go after 
those restrictions arguing that state constitutions may not 
discriminate against religious options." 12 
On the other side of the debate, Robert Chanin, general 
counsel for the National Education Association (NEA), which 
7. /d. 
8. See Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 
TEX. F. 0:\1 C.L. & C.R. 1:-37 (1998); C. Bright, The Establishment Clause and School 
Vouchers: Private Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 193 (1995); Comment, 
School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543 (1994). 
9. fi:in c.s. 689 (2002). 
10. See, ex, Vanessa Blum, Pro-Voucher Forces Celebrate, Prepare for New 
Fights. LE(;AL TIMES, Jul. 1 2002, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1024078920204 ("The next phase of battle will 
take place in tht> states over laws that go further than the Constitution in limiting the 
way public funds may be spent on religious institutions."); Avi Schick, Veni, Vidi, 
Vouchers: Why the Battle for School Vouchers Isn't Over, SLATE, Sep. 17, 2002, 
available at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2071085 (Discussing the obstacle of Blaine 
Amendments ). See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: 
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. 1\EV. 917, 957-72 (listing likely religious-based constitutional challenges 
following Zelman). 
11. Blum, supra note 10. 
12. !d. 
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opposed vouchers in the Zelman case, lamented that "we have 
lost the establishment clause as a weapon in our arsenal 
against voucher programs." 13 He further noted that "many 
state constitutions have related clauses that are more rigorous 
and more far-reaching than the First Amendment." 14 Zelman 
shows that the battle over the constitutionality of voucher 
programs was heading to the state courts. 
While much of the debate has centered on religious-based 
challenges, recent decisions in Florida and Colorado suggest 
that future challenges will be grounded in non-religious 
provisions. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Colorado found the 
state's voucher program unconstitutional in Owens v. Colorado 
Congress of Parents, Teachers & Students. 15 The court reasoned 
that because the program diverted local school funds to schools 
outside a school district's control, it granted school districts 
control over instruction in those schools and thus violated the 
constitutional provision. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Florida 
held in Bush v. Holmes that the state's voucher program 
violated a state constitutional provision mandating a uniform 
school system by redirecting public funds to schools outside the 
uniform system. 16 The two cases reveal potential non-religious-
based challenges to voucher programs in other states. 
B. Likelihood of Future Non-Religious Constitutional Claims 
The purpose of this article is to examine state constitutional 
provisions relating to publicly-funded voucher programs and to 
determine their susceptibility to non-religious-based 
arguments. This article organizes the provisions relating to 
publicly-funded voucher programs into three categories: 
uniformity, local control, and funding provisions. Uniformity 
provisions require states to provide a uniform system of public 
schools. Local control provisions delegate the authority to 
control public schools to local entities, such as the board of 
education of a school district. Funding provisions contain 
language that prohibits states from funding non-public schools. 
Educators, legislators, lawyers, and judges within states with 
such provisions should familiarize themselves with these 
13. Id. 
14. ld. 
15. 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004). 
16. 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
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provisions before considering whether to adopt publicly-funded 
voucher programs. 
II. UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS 
This section explores uniformity provisions, the first 
provisions related to publicly-funded voucher programs 
considered in this Article. It first lists the states with existing 
uniformity provisions, and then discusses two major state court 
decisions with antipodal outcomes. The analysis will show that 
states may have two very different tracks to follow in relation 
to uniformity provision claims. 
Uniformity provisions are state constitutional provisions 
that compel states to provide a uniform system of public 
schools. These provisions may disallow voucher programs 
because they suggest that all schools must have substantially 
the same educational programming and administrative 
structure. As Table 1 shows, fourteen states have 
constitutional provisions that mandate the establishment of a 
uniform system of public schools: Colorado, Florida, Idaho, 
Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. 
Table 1: States with Constitutional Provisions 
Requiring the Establishment of a Uniform System of 
Public Schools 
STATE PROVISION TEXT 
Colorado CoLo. CoNST. The general assembly 
art. IX,§ 2 shall, as soon as 
practicable, provide 
for the establishment 
and maintenance of a 
thorough and uniform 
system of free public 
schools throughout the 
state, wherein all 
residents of the state, 
between the ages of 
six and twenty-one 
years, may be 
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educatedgratuit~~~ly. 
Florida FLA. CONST. art. The education of 
IX,§ l(a) children is a 
fundamental value of 
the people of the State 
of Florida. It is, 
therefore, a 
paramount duty of the 
state to make 
adequate provision for 
the education of all 
children residing 
within its borders. 
Adequate provision 
shall be made by law 
for a uniform, 
efficient, safe, secure, 
and high quality 
system of free public 
schools that allows 
students to obtain a 
high quality education 
and for the 
establishment, 
maintenance, and 
operation of 
institutions of higher 
learning and other 
public education 
programs that the 
needs of the people 
may require. 
Idaho IDAHO CONST. The stability of a 
Art. IX,§ 1 republican form of 
government 
depending mainly 
upon the intelligence 
of the people, it shall 
be the duty of the 
legislature of Idaho, to 
establish and 
maintain a general, 
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uniform and thorough 
system of public, free 
common schools. 
Indiana IND. CONST. Art. Knowledge and 
8, § 1 learning, generally 
diffused throughout a 
community, being 
essential to the 
preservation of a free 
government; it shall 
be the duty of the 
General Assembly to 
encourage, by all 
suitable means, moral, 
intellectual, scientific, 
and agricultural 
improvement; and to 
provide, by law, for a 
general and uniform 
system of Common 
Schools, wherein 
tuition shall be 
without charge, and 
equally open to all. 
Minnesota MINN. CONST. The stability of a 
Art. 13, § 1 republican form of 
government 
depending mainly 
upon the intelligence 
of the people, it is the 
duty of the legislature 
to establish a general 
and uniform system of 
public schools. The 
legislature shall make 
such provisions by 
taxation or otherwise 
as will secure a 
thorough and efficient 
system of public 
schools throughout the 
state. 
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Nevada NEV. CONST. Art. The legislature shall 
11, § 2 provide for a uniform 
system of common 
schools, by which a 
school shall be 
established and 
maintained in each 
school district at least 
six months in every 
year, and any school 
district which shall 
allow instruction of a 
sectarian character 
therein may be 
deprived of its 
proportion of the 
interest of the public 
school fund during 
such neglect or 
infraction, and the 
legislature may pass 
such laws as will tend 
to secure a general 
attendance of the 
children in each school 
district upon said 
public schools. 
New Mexico N.M. CONST. A uniform system of 
Art. 12, § 1 free public schools 
sufficient for the 
education of, and open 
to, all the children of 
school age in the state 
shall be established 
and maintained. 
North N.C. CONST. Art. General and uniform 
Carolina IX,§ 2 system: term. The 
General Assembly 
shall provide by 
taxation and 
otherwise for a 
general and uniform 
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system of free public 
schools, which shall be 
maintained at least 
nine months in every 
year, and wherein 
equal opportunities 
shall be provided for 
all students. 
North Dakota N.D. CONS'!'. Art. The legislative 
8, § 2 assembly shall provide 
for a uniform system 
of free public schools 
throughout the state, 
beginning with the 
primary and 
extending through all 
grades up to and 
including schools of 
higher education, 
except that the 
legislative assembly 
may authorize tuition, 
fees and service 
charges to assist in 
the financing of public 
schools of higher 
education. 
Oregon OR. CONS'!'. Art. The Legislative 
VIII,§ 3 Assembly shall 
provide by law for the 
establishment of a 
uniform, and general 
system of Common 
schools. 
South Dakota S.D. CONS'!'. Art. The stability of a 
8, § 1 republican form of 
government 
depending on the 
morality and 
intelligence of the 
people, it shall be the 
duty of the 
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Legislature to 
establish and 
maintain a general 
and uniform system of 
public schools wherein 
tuition shall be 
without charge, and 
equally open to all; 
and to adopt all 
suitable means to 
secure to the people 
the advantages and 
opportunities of 
education. 
Washington WASH. CONST. The legislature shall 
Art. 9, § 2 provide for a general 
and uniform system of 
public schools. The 
public school system 
shall include common 
schools, and such high 
schools, normal 
schools, and technical 
schools as may 
hereafter be 
established. But the 
entire revenue derived 
from the common 
school fund and the 
state tax for common 
schools shall be 
exclusively applied to 
the support of the 
common schools. 
Wisconsin Wrs. CONST. Art. The legislature shall 
10, § 3 provide by law for the 
establishment of 
district schools, which 
shall be as nearly 
uniform as 
practicable; and such 
schools shall be free 
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and without charge for 
tuition to all children 
between the ages of 4 
and 20 years; and no 
sectarian instruction 
shall be allowed 
therein; but the 
legislature by law 
may, for the purpose 
of religious instruction 
outside the district 
schools, authorize the 
release of students 
during regular school 
hours. 
Wyoming WYO. CONST. The legislature shall 
Art. 7, § 1 provide for the 
establishment and 
maintenance of a 
complete and uniform 
system of public 
instruction, embracing 
free elementary 
schools of every 
needed kind and 
grade, a university 
with such technical 
and professional 
departments as the 
public good may 
require and the means 
of the state allow, and 
such other institutions 
as may be necessary. 
The case law is limited with respect to the state 
constitutionality of voucher programs under uniformity 
provisions. Both Wisconsin and Florida courts, however, have 
ruled on the issue. The dissimilar outcomes in those two cases 
may provide guidelines for potential cases in other states. 
In Davis v. Grover, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
examined the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), a 
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program permitting students from low-income families to 
attend private non-sectarian schools for free. 17 The MPCP paid 
participating schools directly with the state's school funds. 1R 
Opponents argued that the MPCP violated the state's 
uniformity clause, Art. X, § 3, 19 which declares: "The 
legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district 
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and 
such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all 
children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.'>20 The court 
rejected this argument, finding that, rather than serving as a 
mandate that every student attend a public school, "the 
uniformity clause clearly was intended to assure certain 
minimal education opportunities for the children of 
Wisconsin."21 The court found, rather, that the uniformity 
clause "requires the legislature to provide the opportunity for 
all children to receive a free uniform basic education."22 
The Supreme Court of Florida reached a different 
conclusion under its analysis of Florida's uniformity provision. 
In Bush, the court found that Florida's uniformity provision 
prohibited the funding of the Florida Opportunity Scholarship 
Program (OSP), which provided opportunity scholarships in 
order to give parents the opportunity for their children to 
attend a public school that is performing satisfactorily or to 
attend an eligible private school when the parent chooses to 
apply the equivalent of the public education funds generated by 
his or her child to the cost of tuition in the eligible private 
school.23 The court held that the OSP violated Art. IX, § l(a) of 
the Florida Constitution "by devoting the state's resources to 
the education of children within our state system through 
means other than a system of free public schools."24 
The Bush court traced the legislative history of the 
education article and noted that constitutional amendments 
17. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). 
18. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (amended by 2009·2010 Wise. Legis. Serv. Act 28 
(2009 A.B. 75) (West 2009)). 
19. WIS. CO:-.IST. art. X,§ 3. 
20. Id. 
21. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992). 
22. Id. 
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537 (West 1999) (current version at FLA. STAT. ~ 
1002.38 (2009)). 
24. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006). 
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adding the "paramount duty" language to Article IX § l(a)25 
demonstrated the significance of education to Florida and 
mandated that the legislature provide a uniform, public system 
of education.26 Furthermore, the court stressed that the second 
and third sentences of Article IX § l(a) must be read in pari 
material.27 If read along with the "paramount duty" imposed on 
the legislature, the court stated that "[t]he provision mandates 
that the state's obligation is to provide for the education of 
Florida's children, specifics that the manner of fulfilling this 
obligation is by providing a uniform, high quality system of free 
public education, and does not authorize additional equivalent 
alternatives."28 The court held that the OSP violates Art. IX, § 
l(a) by permitting students to obtain a publicly-funded 
education outside the uniform system and uses money to 
support private schools not subject to the requirements of that 
uniform system.29 Under this analysis, Burns found the OSP 
system, as constructed, unconstitutional and that students 
could no longer receive publicly-funded vouchers. The court 
recognized that parents have "the basic right to educate their 
children as they see fit," 30 but not the right to have Florida pay 
for their children to attend private school.31 
The Bush majority noted in a footnote that the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of the MPCP. 
The majority, however, stressed that Florida's constitution 
differs materially from Wisconsin's constitution since 
Wisconsin's does not contain language making it a '"a 
paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the 
education of all children residing within its borders."'32 In 
contrast, the dissent in Bush found no language to substantiate 
the majority's interpretation. Similar to Wisconsin's refusal to 
treat the uniformity clause as restrictive, the dissent found 
that 
25. FLA. CONS'!'. art. IX, § 1. 
26. Sec Bush, 919 So.2d at 398-407. 
27. Id. at 406-07. 
28. Id. at 408. 
29. See id. at 412. 
80. Id. 
:n. Id. at 418. 
32. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006), n. 103mk, quoting FLA. 
CONST. art. IX,§ 1(a). 
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the text does not provide that the government's provision for 
education shall be 'by' or 'through' a system of free public 
schools. Without language of exclusion or preclusion, there is 
no support for the majority's finding that public schools are 
the exclusive means by or through which the government may 
fulfill its duty to make adequate provision for the education of 
every child in Florida. 33 
If courts in other states with uniformity provisions 
challenge the constitutionality of voucher programs, the courts 
likely must determine whether the language of their 
uniformity provisions preclude their legislatures from funding 
additional opportunities outside the public schools system. If 
courts adopt the majority's reasoning in Bush, they will treat 
the public school system mentioned in the systems clause as 
the sole legitimate recipient of public education funds. On the 
other hand, if courts follow Davis, they will likely determine 
that, while the state must provide a minimum level of public 
education, the state legislature may provide additional 
opportunities beyond that level. The legal community in these 
states should be aware of any uniformity clause and 
understand how its interpretation will impact the 
constitutionality of a publicly-funded voucher program. 
III. LOCAL CONTROL PROVISIONS 
This section explores local control provisions and their 
constitutional relevance to publicly-funded voucher programs. 
The analysis first considers potential unconstitutionality 
claims from local control provisions because they dilute school 
boards' authorities to direct education within their district. 
Next, this section briefly expounds on the one existing state 
case providing any contours to the scope of a local control 
provision. The discussion then turns to an analysis of how 
systems provisions, in which state constitutions require states 
to establish a system of public schools, may also raise potential 
constraints on local control. 
Local control provisiOns authorize school boards to 
supervise education within their districts. Table 2 contains the 
six states that have local control provisions. 
33. Id. at 416. 
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Table 2: States with Constitutional Provisions 
Requiring Schools to Be under Local Control 
STATE PROVISION TEXT 
Colorado COLO. CONST. The general assembly 
Art. IX,§ 15 shall, by law, provide 
for organization of 
school districts of 
convenient size, in each 
of which shall be 
established a board of 
education, to consist of 
three or more directors 
to be elected by the 
qualified electors of the 
district. Said directors 
shall have control of 
instruction in the 
public schools of their 
respective districts. 
Florida FLA. CONST. Art. The school board shall 
IX, § 4(b) operate, control and 
supervise all free public 
schools within the 
school district and 
determine the rate of 
school district taxes 
within the limits 
prescribed herein. Two 
or more school districts 
may operate and 
finance joint 
educational programs. 
Georgia GA. CONST. Art. Authority is granted to 
VIII, § 5, ~ . 5 county and area boards 
of education to 
establish and maintain 
public schools within 
their limits. 
Kansas KAN. CONST. Art. Local public schools 
6, § 5 under the general 
supervision of the state 
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board of education shall 
be maintained, 
developed and operated 
by locally elected 
boards. When 
authorized by law, such 
boards may make and 
carry out agreements 
for cooperative 
operation and 
administration of 
educational programs 
under the general 
supervision of the state 
board of education, but 
such agreements shall 
be subject to limitation, 
change or termination 
by the legislature. 
Montana MONT. CONST. The supervision and 
Art. 10, § 8 control of schools in 
each school district 
shall be vested in a 
board of trustees to be 
elected as provided by 
law. 
Virginia VA. CONST. Art. The supervision of 
8, § 7 schools in each school 
division shall be vested 
in a school board, to be 
composed of members 
selected in the manner, 
for the term, possessing 
the qualifications, and 
to the number provided 
by law. 
As Owens illustrates, voucher programs in states with local 
control provisions might be vulnerable to charges of 
unconstitutionality because local control provisions dilute 
school boards' authority to direct the education within their 
districts. In 2003, Colorado enacted the Colorado Opportunity 
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Contract Pilot Program ("COCPP")34 with the aim of improving 
the educational achievement of high-poverty, low-achieving 
children in the public schools. 35 COCPP accepted children 
eligible for free or reduced lunches, 36 who also demonstrated a 
deficiency in a particular area on the Colorado Scholastic 
Assessment Program or ACT college admissions test. 37 Parents 
of qualified children admitted to a participating private school 
entered into contracts with their children's school district.38 
These contracts required the school districts to distribute 
assistance based on the district's educational cost per pupil39 to 
parents, who were then required to endorse the funds to the 
participating private schools.40 
Following the enactment of COCPP in 2003, a group 
of parents, organizations, and other individuals 
challenged its constitutionality in district court. 41 The 
plaintiffs argued that the COCPP violated Art. IX, § 
15 of the Colorado Constitution, which states that 
boards of education established by local school 
districts "shall have control of instruction in the 
public schools of their respective districts."42 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the COCPP violated this 
provision by "depriving local school boards of control 
over instruction in the public schools of their 
respective districts."43 The defendants argued that 
the voucher program did not violate Art. IX, § 15 
because the state had extensive control over education 
as well as how local schools districts utilized 
funding. 44 The trial court reviewed the Colorado 
Supreme Court cases that interpreted and applied 
Article IX, § 15,45 ultimately concluding that the court 
34. See COLO. REV. STAT.§ 22-56-101 (2003) (repealed 2006). 
35. See id. at§ 22-56-102(1)(a). 
36. See id. at§ 22-56-104(2)(a). 
37. See id. at§ 22-56-104 (2)(b)(l)(A)-(B). 
38. See id. at§ 22-56-107(1). 
39. See id. at§ 22-56-108(2)(a)-(b)(I-III). 
40. See id. at§ 22-56-109(4)(a). 
41. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students v. Owens, 2003 WL 23870661 
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Dec. :3. 20ml), aff'd, 92 P.3d 93;3 (Colo. 2004). 
42. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15. 
43. Owens, 200:3 WL 2:3870661 at *1. 
44. /d. at *11-12. 
45. See, e.g., Belier v. Wilson, 14 7 P. 355 (Colo. 1915); School Dist. No. 16 in 
Adams County v. Union High Sch. No. 1 in Adams County, 152 P. 1149 (Colo. 1915); 
Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Ed., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
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had "consistently interpreted section 15 as requiring 
that the local board have significant control over the 
instruction for the district's students."46 The court 
held that the COCPP violated Art. IX, § 15 "[b]y 
stripping all discretion from the local school district 
over the instruction to be provided in the voucher 
program."47 
The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado 
and argued that the COCPP did not interfere with local control 
because participating students left the district. 48 The 
defendants also argued that since the state supplied the 
majority of funding to the public schools, the court should 
interpret Art. IX, § 15 as permitting COCPP as a matter of 
public policy.49 The court reinforced the state constitution's 
commitment to local control of education, stating, "In that 
provision, the framers made the choice to place control 'as near 
the people as possible' by creating a representative government 
in miniature to govern instruction."50 After reviewing the same 
line of cases interpreting Art. IX, § 15 as the district court, the 
state supreme court found local control indistinguishable from 
control over the use of funds. 51 
While no other local control state has considered the 
constitutionality of a publicly-funded voucher program under a 
local control provision, the Supreme Court of Kansas has 
identified a limitation in another context. In Board of 
Education v. Kansas State Board of Education, the court found 
a statute constitutional which granted the state board of 
education the authority to approve or disapprove interlocal 
agreements between school districts.52 The court found that 
while Art. VI, § 5 did grant school boards the authority to 
maintain, operate and develop local schools, "this power is 
qualified, however, in that such authority exists only 'under the 
general supervision of the state board of education."'53 The 
court also reviewed the legislative history of Kansas' control 
46. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students v. Owens, 2003 WL 23870661. *9 
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Dec. 3. 2003), af('d, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004). 
47. Owens, 2003 WL 23870661 at *12. 
48. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, 92 P.3d 933, 935 (Colo. 2004). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 939. 
51. Id. at 940. 
52. Bd. of Educ. v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 966 P.2d 68, 85 (Kan. 1998). 
53. Id. at 83. 
2] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VOUCHER PROGRAMS 293 
provision and found that the legislature intended to expand the 
authority of the state board of education. 54 One must keep in 
mind, however, that Kansas has the only control state 
provision containing language that qualifies local control or 
explicitly mentions the state board of education. 
Systems provisions, in which state constitutions require 
states to establish a system of public schools, may also raise 
potential constraints on local control. For example, a recent 
Florida case upheld the constitutionality of a charter school 
statute that permits Florida's Department of Education to 
overrule a local district's denial of a charter school 
application. 55 The local school board in that case argued that 
the statute permitted the department of education to open a 
charter school, which violated Florida's control provision, Art. 
IX, § 4(b). 56 The court found that the statute did not interfere 
with local district control because the department of 
education's approval of an application did not equate to an 
approval of the opening of a schooP7 Instead, the court found 
this only began the process and the local district still had the 
power to deny or reject an application or revoke an existing 
charter. sx The court concluded that, in accordance with 
Florida's system provision, "while the school board shall 
operate, control and supervise all free public schools within 
their district, the State Board of Education has supervision 
over the system of free public education as provided by law."59 
Therefore, local control states must be aware of additional 
provisions, such as systems provisions, which may restrict local 
control over public schools. 
IV. FUNDING PROVISIONS 
This section explores funding provisions and the issues they 
raise for voucher program initiatives. It lists the states with 
funding provisions and then introduces relevant case law on 
voucher programs. The section also discusses the potential 
issues triggered by publicly-funded voucher programs. 
54. Id. at 84. 
55. Sch. Bd. v. Acad. of Excellence, Inc., 974 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 2008). 
56. /d. at 1191. 
57. Id. at 1192. 
58. Id. 
59. !d. at 119:3. 
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Funding provisions include language related to potential 
limitations on the funding of schools within states. These 
provisions can be subdivided into four categories: (i) those 
explicitly barring the funding of private schools; (ii) those 
barring funding to any school that is not under exclusive 
control of the state; (iii) those limiting the money raised for 
education (i.e., school fund) to public, common or free schools; 
and (iv) those that require public money to be spent for public 
purposes. The provisions in each category raise unique 
obstacles to publicly-funded voucher programs. 
A. Provisions Explicitly Barring the Funding of Private Schools 
Table 3 includes the seven states that have constitutional 
provisions barring the public funding of private schools: 
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, New Mexico, South 
Carolina and Wyoming. 
Table 3: States with Constitutional Provisions 
Explicitly Barring the Funding of Private Schools. 
STATE PROVISION TEXT 
Alaska ALASKA CONST. No money shall be paid 
art. XII,§ 1 from public funds for 
the direct benefit of 
any religious or other 
private educational 
institution. 
Arizona ARIZ. CONST. art. No tax shall be laid or 
IX,§ 10 appropriation of public 
money made in aid of 
any church, or private 
or sectarian school, or 
any public service 
corporation. 
Hawaii HAW. CONST. art. [N]or shall public funds 
10, § 1 be appropriated for the 
support or benefit of 
any sectarian or 
nonsectarian private 
educational 
institution ... 
Michigan MICH. CONST. No payment, credit, tax 
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art. 8, § 2 benefit, exemption or 
deductions, tuition 
voucher, subsidy, grant 
or loan of public monies 
or property shall be 
provided, directly or 
indirectly, to support 
the attendance of any 
student or the 
employment of any 
person at any such 
nonpublic school ... 
New Mexico N.M. CONST. art. [N]o part of the 
12, § 3 proceeds arising from 
the sale or disposal of 
any lands granted to 
the state by congress, 
or any other funds 
appropriated, levied or 
collected for 
educational purposes, 
shall be used for the 
support of any 
sectarian, 
denominational or 
private school, college 
or university. 
South S.C. CONST. art. No money shall be paid 
Carolina XI,§ 4 from public funds nor 
shall the credit of the 
State or any of its 
political subdivisions 
be used for the direct 
benefit of any religious 
or other private 
educational institution. 
Wyoming WYO. CONST. art. [N]or shall any portion 
VII,§ 8 of any public school 
fund ever be used to 
support or assist any 
private school, or any 
school, academy, 
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seminary, college or 
other institution of 
learning controlled by 
any church or sectarian 
organization or 
religious denomination 
whatsoever. 
Among these, Arizona is the only state listed with courts 
that have applied the funding provision to a publicly-funded 
voucher program.60 In 2006, the Arizona legislature passed two 
laws granting vouchers to foster children,61 and also children 
with disabilities.62 In accordance with both statutes, the state 
would provide money to parents and required them to endorse 
the funds to participating public and private schools. 63 The 
Arizona voucher programs made both sectarian and non-
sectarian schools eligible to participate in both voucher 
programs. 
In the 2007 case of Cain v. Horne, 64 a group of individuals 
filed suit against the superintendent of schools to enjoin him 
from implementing the Arizona voucher programs. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the Arizona voucher programs violated a 
number of constitutional provisions, including Article IX, § 10, 
which provides that "no tax shall be laid or appropriation of 
public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian 
school, or any public service corporation."65 The trial court 
disagreed, holding that the Arizona voucher programs were 
constitutional and stated in reference to both statutes that "no 
appropriation of public money is being made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school in violation of Article 9, 
Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution."66 
The appellate court vacated the lower court's decision and 
held that the Arizona voucher programs violated Article IX, § 
10.67 Invoking the plain meaning rule, the court held that the 
60. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009). 
61. ARIZ. RF:V. STAT. ANN.§ 15-817 (2009). 
62. Id. at§ 15-891. 
63. See id. at§ 15-817.01, 15.891-03(F). 
64. Cain v. Horne, 2007 WL 1891530 (Ariz. Super. Ct. ,Jum) 14, 2007). 
65. ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10. 
66. Cain, 2007 WL 1891530, *1. 
67. Cain v. Horne, 183 P.3d 1269, 1276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
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constitutional provision clearly prohibited the provision of 
tuition to private schools. 6g The appellants argued that the 
public aid of Arizona voucher programs primarily benefited the 
students attending private schools, and therefore the Arizona 
voucher programs avoided the constitution's prohibition on 
public aid to private schools by dispensing funds directly to 
students. 69 The court of appeals rejected this argument but 
acknowledged that courts had been willing to apply the true 
beneficiary theory in instances in which states provided 
transportation and textbooks to private schools students.70 
However, the court stressed that tuition payments are 
undoubtedly a direct benefit to private schools: 
Tuition and institutional fees go directly to the institution 
and are its very life blood .... Surely a payment by the State 
of the tuition and fees of the pupils of a private school begun 
on the strength of a contract by the State to do so would be an 
appropriation to that school. 71 
The court of appeals then remanded the case to the lower 
court and ordered it to enjoin the superintendent from 
implementing the Arizona voucher programs.72 The Supreme 
Court of Arizona upheld the court of appeals decision, stating 
that "the language and purpose of the Aid Clause do not permit 
the appropriations these voucher programs provide; to rule 
otherwise would amount to 'aid of . . . private or sectarian 
school[s],' Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 10, and render the clause a 
nullity."73 
Although states with funding provisiOns similar to 
Arizona's have not considered the constitutionality of publicly-
funded voucher programs, the attorneys general of Hawaii and 
New Mexico have issued similar opinions on the issue.74 New 
68. ld. 
69. ld. at 1276. 
70. See, e.g., Bowker v. Baker, 167 P.2d 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (transporting 
students does constitute as aid to students); Chance v. Miss. State Textbook Rating 
and Purchasing Bd., 200 So. 706 (Miss. 1941) (supplying textbooks does not constitute 
aid to students). But see Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) 
(transporting students constitutes benefit to private schools); Spears v. Honda, 449 
P.2d 130 (Haw. 1968) (transporting students constitutes unconstitutional benefit to 
private educational institutions). 
71. Cain, 183 P.3d at 1276. 
72. ld. at 1278. 
73. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009). 
74. See N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-01 (1999), available at 
http://www.nmag.gov/pdf/01-29-99_school_voucher.pdf; The Constitutionality of School 
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Mexico's Attorney General stated that its funding clause 
forbade the use of public funds to support private schools and, 
"[a]s a result, we believe that a New Mexico court addressing 
the issue would likely conclude that tuition assistance under a 
voucher program constitutes the unconstitutional use of public 
money for the support of 'sectarian, denominational or private' 
schools, whether the money is paid directly to the schools, the 
students or the parents."75 Similarly, Hawaii's Attorney 
General noted that Hawaii's courts had found that the public 
provision of student transportation to private school violated of 
the state's funding clause prohibiting aid to private educational 
institutions because 
(1) the bus subsidy "built up, strengthened and made 
successful" the nonpublic schools; (2) the bus subsidy induced 
attendance at nonpublic schools, where the school children 
are exposed to a curriculum that, in many cases, if not 
generally, promotes the special interests and biases of the 
nonpublic group that controls the school; and (3) to the extent 
that the State paid out funds to carriers owned by the 
nonpublic schools or agents thereof, the State gave tangible 
"support or benefit" to such schools. 76 
The Hawaii Attorney General concluded that if bus 
subsidies constituted an unconstitutional form of support of 
private schools, then publicly-funded voucher programs that 
provided tuition funds to private schools must also. 77 The 
Horne case and opinions from Hawaii and New Mexico seem to 
indicate that publicly-funded voucher programs would likely 
violate the state's constitution, containing a funding provision 
that explicitly bars funding to private schools. 
B. Provisions Barring Funding to Any School That Is Not 
Under Exclusive Control of the State 
Table 4 contains the funding provisions of the three states 
that prohibit funding schools that are not under exclusive state 
control. These states include: California, Massachusetts and 
Nebraska. 
Vouchers in Hawaii, Haw. Att'y Gen. Op. 03-01 (200:i), auailable at 
http:/ /hawaii. gov/ ag/main/publications/opinions/2003/03-0 1. pdf. 
75. N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-01, 2 (1999) (quoting N.M. CoNST. art. 12, § 3). 
76. Id. (quoting Spears v. Honda, 449 P.2d 130, 137<~8 (Haw. 1968)). 
77. Id. 
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Table 4: States with Constitutional Provisions 
Barring Funding to Any School That Is Not Under 
Exclusive Control of the State 
STATE PROVISION TEXT 
California CAL. CONST. art. No public money 
IX,§ 8 shall ever be 
appropriated for the 
support of any 
sectarian or 
denominational 
school, or any school 
not under the 
exclusive control of 
the officers of the 
public schools; nor 
shall any sectarian or 
denominational 
doctrine be taught, or 
instruction thereon 
be permitted, directly 
or indirectly, in any 
of the common 
schools of this State. 
Massachusetts MASS. CONST. No grant, 
amend. art. appropriation or use 
XVIII,§ 2 of public money or 
property or loan of 
credit shall be made 
or authorized by the 
commonwealth or any 
political subdivision 
thereof for the 
purpose of founding, 
maintaining or aiding 
any ... pnmary or 
secondary school ... 
which is not publicly 
owned and under the 
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exclusive control, l 
order and supervision 
of public officers or 
public agents 
authorized by the 
commonwealth or 
federal authority or 
both ... 
Nebraska NEB. CONST. Notwithstanding any 
art. VII, § 11 other provision in the 
Constitution, 
appropriation of 
public funds shall not 
be made to any school 
or institution of 
learning not owned or 
exclusively controlled 
by the state or a 
political subdivision 
thereof ... 
The case law in these states is very limited with respect to 
publicly-funded voucher programs. In State ex. rel. Rogers v. 
Swanson, the Nebraska Supreme Court invalidated a statute 
that provided public grants to Nebraska students attending 
private institutions within the state.78 In rejecting the 
argument that the funds actually benefit students and not 
institutions, the court stated that the state legislature could 
not elude the constitutional prohibition on aiding institutions 
outside state control by restrictively endorsing tuition 
payments to parents.79 Furthermore, "[l]imiting the grants to 
students attending independent institutions in Nebraska 
insures that all these funds will inure to the benefit of 
institutions not owned or controlled by the state.'>SO 
Similarly, the courts in California and Massachusetts 
would likely find a statute establishing a publicly-funded 
voucher program unconstitutional if interpreting their funding 
provisions in the same manner as Nebraska. Even if 
78. 219 N.W.2d 726 (Neb. 1974). 
79. Id. at 729-30. 
80. Id. at 733. 
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legislatures attempt to provide tuition payments directly to 
parents instead of the private schools, the courts will still likely 
invalidate the voucher program by focusing on the monetary 
benefit that eventually passes to the private schools. In 
operation, the funding provisions prohibiting public funding to 
schools "not under the exclusive control of the state" appear 
equivalent to the provisions precluding the public funding of 
private schools. Based on the decisions in Horne and Rogers, a 
voucher program would not be constitutional under either type 
of funding provision. 
C. Provisions Limiting Funds to Public Schools 
Nine states have constitutional provisiOns limiting 
educational funds to public, free or common schools: 
Connecticut, Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and Washington. Table 5 
provides the pertinent constitutional provisions of these states. 
Table 5: States with Constitutional Provisions 
Limiting Funds to Public Schools. 
STATE PROVISION TEXT 
Connecticut CONN. CONST. The fund, called the 
art. VIII, § 4 SCHOOL FUND, shall 
remain a perpetual 
fund, the interest of 
which shall be 
inviolably 
appropriated to the 
support and 
encouragement of the 
public schools 
throughout the state, 
and for the equal 
benefit of all the 
people thereof. The 
value and amount of 
said fund shall be 
ascertained in such 
manner as the general 
assembly may 
prescribe, published, 
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and recorded in the 
comptroller's office; 
and no law shall ever 
be made, authorizing 
such fund to be 
diverted to any other 
use than the 
encouragement and 
support of public 
schools, among the 
several school 
societies, as justice 
and equity shall 
require. 
Georgia GA. CONST. art. School tax funds shall 
VIII,§ 6 be expended only for 
the support and 
maintenance of public 
schools, public 
vocational-technical 
schools, public 
education, and 
activities necessary or 
incidental thereto, 
including school lunch 
purposes. 
Missouri Mo. CONST. art. [A] public school 
IX,§ 5 fund ... shall be 
faithfully appropriated 
for establishing and 
maintaining free 
public schools, and for 
no other uses or 
purposes whatsoever. 
New Jersey N.J. CONST. art. The fund for the 
8, § 4, ,1 2 support of free public 
schools ... shall be 
annually appropriated 
to the support of free 
public schools, and for 
the equal benefit of all 
the people of the State; 
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and it shall not be 
competent, except as 
hereinafter provided, 
for the Legislature to 
borrow, appropriate or 
use the said fund or 
any part thereof for 
any other purpose, 
under any pretense 
whatever. 
North N.C. CONST. art. [S]hall be faithfully 
Carolina IX,§ 6 appropriated and used 
exclusively for 
establishing and 
maintaining a uniform 
system of free public 
schools. 
Rhode Island R.I. CONST. art. The money which now 
12, § 2 is or which may 
hereafter be 
R.I. CONST. art. appropriated by law 
12, § 4 for the establishment 
of a permanent fund 
for the support of 
public schools, shall be 
securely invested and 
remain a perpetual 
fund for that purpose. 
The general assembly 
shall make all 
.. 
necessary provisiOns 
by law for carrying 
this article into effect. 
It shall not divert said 
money or fund from 
the aforesaid uses, nor 
borrow, appropriate, 
or use the same, or 
any part thereof, for 
any other purpose, 
under any pretence 
whatsoever. 
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South Dakota S.D. CONST. art. [A]nd remain a 
VIII,§ 2 perpetual fund for the 
maintenance of public 
schools in the state. It 
shall be deemed a 
trust fund held by the 
state. The principal 
shall never be diverted 
by legislative 
enactment for any 
other purpose, and 
may be increased; but, 
if any loss occurs 
through any 
unconstitutional act, 
the state shall make 
the loss good through 
a special 
appropriation. 
Texas TEX. CONST. art. The available school 
VII,§ 5 fund shall be applied 
annually to the 
support of the public 
free schools. Except as 
provided by this 
section, the legislature 
may not enact a law 
appropriating any part 
of the permanent 
school fund or 
available school fund 
to any other purpose. 
The permanent school 
fund and the available 
school fund may not be 
appropriated to or 
used for the support of 
any sectarian school. 
Washington WASH. CONST. [T]he entire revenue 
Art. IX, 2 derived from the 
common school fund 
and the state tax for 
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common schools shall 
be exclusively applied 
to the support of the 
common schools. 
In preparing this article, the authors did not discover any 
case law related to the constitutionality of publicly-funded 
voucher programs within these states. In a related but not 
strictly analogous case, a Washington court invalidated a 
statute that provided public funding for transporting students 
to private schools for violating the funding clause by utilizing 
funds for purposes other than common school purposes. 81 The 
statute in that case required school districts to carry private 
school students on public school buses free of charge. 82 The 
court stated that although the statute did not specifically 
procure funds from the common school fund, the act of busing 
students free of charge to private school necessitated the use of 
those funds because they were already used to fund the public 
school busing system. 83 By extension, a voucher program that 
used public school funds to pay tuition at private schools would 
likely violate provisions limiting funds to public schools. To 
pass state constitutional scrutiny, a voucher program in these 
states would likely need to use funds from other sources than 
the prescribed school fund. 
D. Public Purpose Provisions 
As Frank Kemerer has noted, most states have 
constitutional provisions requiring states to spend public funds 
for public purposes, but courts generally defer to the 
legislature's judgment on the nature of public purposes.84 
However, Kentucky courts have invalidated statutes for 
violating the state's public purpose doctrine statues85 which 
provided for textbook loans to private school students86 and 
utilized tax revenues to pay private schools for transportation 
81. Mitchell v. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943). 
82. See id. at 80. 
83. Id. at 82. 
84. See Kemerer, supra note 8, at 169-70. 
85. KY. CONST. § 171 ("Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only 
.... "). 
86. Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983). 
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subsidiesP Although courts are generally willing to defer to 
state legislatures, as Kemerer suggests, the statutes 
establishing voucher programs would likely need to relate the 
programs to a public interest.88 
V. CONCLUSION 
The state constitutional provisions related to voucher 
programs are varied and present a number of challenges to 
potential legislative initiatives. Although the legal community 
initially anticipated challenges based on religious provisions, 
recent cases demonstrate that future challenges may be 
predicated on non-religious provisions. The case law on state 
constitutional challenges to publicly-funded voucher programs 
is limited, but increased voucher program legislative initiatives 
and popularity signal the likelihood of future challenges in the 
courts. This article suggests that educators, lawyers, and 
legislators analyze non-religious provisions along the systems, 
local control, and funding framework in order to determine the 
susceptibility of potential voucher programs to state 
constitutional challenges. Finally, future challenges should 
clarify the distinctions between provisions and reveal whether 
state constitutions allow publicly-funded voucher programs. 
87. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Brady, 885 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1994). 
88. Kemerer, supra note 8, at 69-70. 
